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Abstract
In this paper, we provide an explanation of why privatization may attract foreign in-
vestors willing to enter a regional market. Privatization turns the formerly-public firm
into a less aggressive competitor since profit-maximizing output is lower than the welfare-
maximizing one. The drawback is that social welfare generally decreases. We also investi-
gate tax/subsidy competition for FDI and put forward its potentially positive role. On the
one hand, it may reduce the negative impact on welfare of an FDI-attracting privatization.
On the other hand, it may prevent a welfare-reducing investment by the foreign firm. This
sheds light on the substitute/complementary relationship between the two policies and the
two objectives of governments.
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1 Introduction
One of the most well documented trends in the world economy over the last decades has been
the rise in foreign direct investments (FDI) by multinational enterprises (MNEs). At an ag-
gregate level, the empirical evidence indicates that, due to the existence of trade costs, the
growth of FDI in the last 15 years of the 20th century far outpaced that of international trade
among industrialized countries.1 Moreover, because of the widely held advantages of receiving
FDI (e.g., cheaper or higher-quality goods for domestic consumers, technological spillovers
to domestic producers, job creation, etc.), governments at different levels are prone to offer
MNEs countervailing incentives to attract their investments. Competition mostly takes place
between countries belonging to the same economic or geographical area (e.g., Latin America,
South-East Asia, Central and Eastern Europe, and so on).2 In spite of that, FDI by foreign
MNEs can be an issue to the extent that foreign firms investing in a country often operate in
the same sector as some incumbent local firm, which is, in some cases, a public enterprise.3
In recent years, however, parallel to the massive increase in FDI, privatizations have become
an important tool of industrial restructuring in all parts of the world: “Since 1990, European
governments have sold more than $450 billion worth of state assets in many different sectors,
including the banking, insurance, telecommunication and automobile industries. Many coun-
tries are also announcing substantial forthcoming privatizations” (Norba¨ck and Persson, 2005,
p. 635). And privatization waves are certainly not confined to the European Union.4
The primary aim of our work is to analyze the effects of privatization on attractiveness
and welfare of a potentially FDI-receiving country. We also investigate how privatization and
tax/subsidy policies may interact when countries compete to attract FDI. To this end, we
consider a foreign-owned MNE willing to enter a regional market which is already served by a
welfare-maximizing public firm. We define the attractiveness of a country as a relative concept:
it is a comparison from the foreign firm’s perspective between the advantages of investing in
that country rather than elsewhere and takes into account both operating profits and taxes
paid to or subsidies received from the host country. By privatization, we mean a transfer in
ownership rights from the government to domestic private investors, which simply translates
into a change in the firm’s objective function.
The issues we are interested in are related to the theoretical literature on mixed oligopoly.
The latter has generally focused on the optimal strategies of the public firm, the characteriza-
tion of market equilibria and the effects of privatization by adapting the standard models of
oligopolistic competition to the welfare-maximizing behavior of public firms.5 More recently,
closer attention has been paid to international mixed oligopoly given that the public firm’s
1See, e.g., Markusen (1995), Markusen and Venables (1998), and Barba Navaretti et al. (2004).
2For an overview of this issue, see Oman (2001).
3For instance, in the Norwegian oil industry, the state-owned Statoil competes with two MNEs, Esso Norge
and Norske Shell.
4In the 1990s, e.g., Russia privatized its aircraft industry, Colombia its state-owned automobile maker
Colombia Automotriz, and Argentina pursued a policy of selective privatization.
5See Rees (1984), Bo¨s (1986), de Fraja and Delbono (1989), and Beato and Mas-Colell (1984).
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behavior is sensitive to the nationality of its private competitor (Fjell and Pal, 1996; Fjell and
Heywood, 2002). In particular, some work has been devoted to the analysis of instruments,
such as production subsidies, that are alternative to direct public provision (Pal and White,
1998; Sepahvand, 2004); to the study of partial privatization and optimum tariffs (Chao and
Yu, 2006); or to make the timing of competition endogenous (Cornes and Sepahvand, 2003;
Matsumura, 2003). Other contributions (Norba¨ck and Persson, 2004; 2005) have studied com-
petition between foreign and domestic private firms as potential buyers of state-owned assets
which are sold at an auction during the privatization process.
In this paper, we apply the analysis of international mixed oligopoly to a context where two
active governments seek to attract FDI by a foreign firm from a third country. Our theoretical
framework builds on the literature about policy competition for FDI. Namely, on those con-
tributions considering imperfect product market competition, country-size asymmetry, and
intra-regional trade costs. This strand of the literature grows out of the paper by Haufler
and Wooton (1999)(henceforth H&W), which analyzes competition between two countries of
unequal size trying to attract a foreign-owned monopolist. Both countries are willing to offer
a subsidy to the firm but, in equilibrium, the large country wins the competition for FDI
since the firm prefers locating in the big market in order to save on trade costs. Moreover, if
the market-size difference is great enough, the large country may be able to levy a positive
lump-sum tax on the foreign firm’s profit. Bjorvatn and Eckel (2006) modify H&W’s set-up
by introducing a private firm - in the big country - which competes with the foreign investor
on the regional market. As a consequence, the FDI decision is driven by a trade-off between
the advantage of locating in the big market (market size effect) and the benefit of being a
monopolist in the small market (competition effect). The intensity of policy competition and
the resulting equilibrium policy (i.e., a subsidy or a tax) depend on the relative location ad-
vantages offered by the two countries. An interesting result is that aggregate welfare (the
sum of regional welfare and the investor’s profits) rises whenever the introduction of policy
competition changes the investor’s location decision. In our model, we follow Bjorvatn and
Eckel (2006) and postulate that the big country already hosts an incumbent firm serving the
regional market. However, we assume that the competitor of the foreign investor is not a
private firm but a welfare-maximizing and relatively inefficient public firm.
Our main contribution is to show that privatization always makes the big country more
attractive from the foreign investor’s perspective. In fact, it turns the formerly-public incum-
bent into a less aggressive competitor for the MNE since profit-maximizing output is always
lower than the welfare-maximizing one. Such a result is important for empirical research on
this issue since it provides a direction of causality between privatization and FDI. Indeed, the
FDI-attracting property of privatization finds support in several empirical studies. Carstensen
and Toubal (2004) and Merlevede and Schoors (2005) point out the positive impact of priva-
tization on FDI into the Central and Eastern European transition economies, irrespective of
whether privatization sales are opened to foreign investors or not. More specifically, Trevin˜o et
al. (2002a,b) focus on the effects of domestic privatization. They find a significant positive im-
pact of the value of privatization less FDI in privatized companies on the FDI inflows to seven
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Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela)
during the 1988-1999 and 1988-1992 periods, respectively. Their results confirm the previous
contribution by Hartenek (1995) about Argentina, who contends that privatization programs
have given foreign companies more opportunities to invest within host Latin American coun-
tries. The speculative argument typically used to account for the FDI-attracting property
of privatization is that the latter sends a signal of a more favorable economic environment
to potential foreign investors. Our simple model puts forward an alternative micro-founded
explanation based on market competition: privatization leads the domestic firm to reduce
output because of the change in its objective, and leaves larger profit opportunities to foreign
investors willing to enter the market.
In spite of that, for the very same reason, consumers are adversely affected and social
welfare decreases as well, unless the incumbent firm is too inefficient. This negative effect on
welfare may be mitigated in the presence of tax/subsidy competition. Following privatization,
the relative advantage to the MNE from investing in the big country increases by so much that
the latter’s government can tax away some of the profits without inducing the MNE to prefer
investing in the other country. In this way, the government optimally balances attractiveness
and welfare in the new international private duopoly setting. Nevertheless, the overall effect
of an FDI-attracting privatization is always negative if the domestic firm is efficient enough.
Following an independent line of research, Mukherjee and Suetrong (2009) analyze the
relationship between privatization and FDI in a model in which a foreign firm has to decide
how to serve another country’s market (i.e., FDI or exports) in the presence of a public
incumbent. The government is able to strategically manipulate the objective of the domestic
firm by changing the weights attached to welfare and profits. By increasing the weight attached
to the latter (i.e., by increasing the share of private ownership in the domestic incumbent), the
foreign firm may be induced to prefer FDI to exports and this, in turn, may increase welfare.
It is well-known from the standard analysis of the second-best theory (Bo¨s, 1986; Lipsey and
Lancaster, 1956–1957; Rees, 1984) that this amounts to give to a welfare-maximizing firm the
leadership in a Stackelberg game with the foreign firm acting as the follower.6 In other words,
instead of giving to the government the strategic advantage of manipulating the objective
function of the domestic firm through partial privatization, the same outcome can be achieved
if the government is given the strategic advantage to directly choose the quantity produced
by a fully state-owned firm. In our paper, we choose not to give any strategic advantage to
the players and firms are assumed to play a simultaneous quantity-setting game.7
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the main trade-off at work
in our model in the simplest possible set-up. In Section 3, we describe the basic two-stage game
that will be used to analyze the investment decision of the MNE. In Section 4, we solve the
second stage of the game in which market competition between the MNE and the incumbent
6See also Matsumura (1998) about the limitations of the convex combination approach to identify the
objective function of a partially privatized firm.
7We get qualitatively similar results if we follow the model by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) and allow for
endogenous timing in the order of moves by firms. We rely on Cournot competition to facilitate the exposition.
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firm occurs, while in Section 5, we investigate the first stage of the game. Section 6 presents the
main results of the paper on the effects of privatization on FDI-attractiveness and welfare. In
Section 7, we introduce tax/subsidy competition between countries and analyze the interaction
between privatization and policy competition. In Section 8, we discuss the robustness of our
results to some specific issues. Finally, Section 9 summarizes the main conclusions emerging
from our work. All computations and proofs are gathered in the Appendix.
2 A simple illustration of the attractiveness-welfare trade-off
Consider a region composed by two countries (A and B) of different market size, where
demands for a final good are given by
QA = 1− pA and QB = n (1− pB )
with n > 1 and Qj and pj denoting the total quantity and the price to consumers on country
j’s market, respectively.
The big country B already hosts a welfare-maximizing public firm producing a non-
exportable final good for its domestic residents. A foreign profit-maximizing firm producing
the same good is willing to make an investment in the region and has to choose the most prof-
itable country in which to locate its production unit.8 Its decision depends on the difference in
market size, which works in favor of the big country, and on the degree of competition, which
favors the small country. We further assume that the public and the foreign firm have the
same constant marginal production cost, c < 1, and, if investment takes place in B, Cournot
competition occurs.
The monopoly profits from investing in the small country are equal to ΠA = (1−c)
2
4 .
9 By
contrast, the profits the foreign firm can realize by investing in B are nil since the public firm
produces a quantity QB = n (1− c) such that price equals marginal cost and there is no room
for competitors. In such a situation, the foreign firm always invests in the small country and
social welfare in the big country - the unweighted sum of consumer surplus, CS, and domestic
firm’s profits, Π0 - is given by WB =
n(1−c)2
2 .
Suppose now that the public firm is sold to domestic private investors. Privatization
changes the firm’s objective from welfare to profit maximization. As a result, if the foreign
firm invests in country B, it earns private duopoly Cournot profits equal to ΠB = n(1−c)
2
9 ,
which exceed the monopoly profits from investing in A as long as n > 94 . Hence, privatization
increases the attractiveness of the big country as it may now be possible that the foreign firm
chooses to invest in B. However, such an FDI-attracting privatization policy always decreases
social welfare. Indeed, it is immediate to show that
WP
B
= CSP + ΠP
0
=
2n (1− c)2
9
+
n (1− c)2
9
=
n (1− c)2
3
< WB =
n (1− c)2
2
.
8For simplicity, we assume that the foreign firm has some financial constraints preventing it from making
more than one investment.
9Throughout the paper, we will use the superscript to indicate the country where the MNE locates its
production facility.
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In what follows, we will extend such a simple model along several lines. We will let the
public firm be as efficient as or less efficient than the foreign firm. We will also consider
exportable final goods in the presence of intra-regional trade costs. In spite of that, the
trade-off for the big country between attractiveness and welfare will generally be at work.
3 The model
We consider a firm from a third-country (we will refer to it as firm 1, the MNE or the foreign
firm) which has to decide in which of two countries to invest (i.e., to locate a production
plant) in order to provide some final good to the consumers of the whole region. We postulate
that the markets of the two countries differ in size and that an incumbent public firm already
serves the entire regional market from the big country.
Firstly, we analyze the effects of privatization on the investment decision of the foreign firm
and on welfare. To this end, we compare the outcome of two games, which differ depending
on whether - before the game starts - the incumbent on the regional market is a public
welfare-maximizing or a private profit-maximizing firm. The model can then be described
as a two-stage game of perfect information where, in the first stage, the foreign firm decides
in which country to locate its production plant, and in the second stage, firms compete in
quantities on the two markets.
Secondly, we introduce tax/subsidy competition for FDI between the two countries and
analyze how fiscal and privatization policies may affect the investment decision of the MNE
and welfare. This is done by introducing a pre-play stage to the two-stage game of perfect
information outlined above. In this stage, the two countries post a irreversible offer in terms
of lump-sum tax/subsidy to the MNE in order to attract its investment. As before, the
analysis of privatization is a comparative statics exercise contrasting the outcome of two
three-stage games, one with a public welfare-maximizing firm and the other with a private
profit-maximizing firm.
As we will see below, each country’s market can be characterized by different competitive
structures depending on the location decision of the MNE, on the production choices of the
two firms, and on the nature of the incumbent firm.
The basic set-up
The markets of the two countries are of unequal size. Namely, in line with Haufler and Wooton
(1999), we assume that a single consumer lives in country A and n ≥ 1 identical consumers
live in country B, which, for n > 1, represents the “big” market for the final good. In the
status quo ante, no production takes place in the small country, whereas a welfare-maximizing
public firm (firm 0) operates in the big country.10
10We do not exclude the symmetric-country case (n = 1). By contrast, we do not consider the case where
the public firm operates in the small country. This, in fact, leads to the trivial conclusion that the MNE always
prefers to invest in the big country with no local competitor.
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The incumbent firm and the foreign MNE produce and sell the same product and compete
a` la Cournot on the two markets. In particular, the incumbent firm is assumed to be less
efficient than the MNE, i.e., it produces the final good at a higher marginal cost, c0 > c1 ≥ 0,
with ci denoting the constant marginal production cost of firm i = 0, 1. Moreover, it serves
the small market through exports by incurring positive per unit trade costs, τ > 0. The MNE,
instead, has to bear a fixed cost F > 0 to establish a production plant in either country since
trade costs associated with exporting from its residence country to the region are assumed to
be prohibitively high compared to trade costs within the region (τ).11
The marginal cost of serving a market thus depends on the efficiency of the firm and on
its location. When the final good is produced and sold locally, the marginal cost is given
by ci , i = 0, 1; by contrast, when the firm exports the final good to the other country, the
marginal cost is higher since it also includes intra-regional trade costs, τ . The latter separate
the two markets so that consumer prices for the same final good will be different in the two
countries.12 But since the two firms sell a homogeneous good, its consumer price in a given
market will be the same irrespective of where production takes place.13
Denoting by qij the quantity of the final good sold by firm i on country j’s market (i =
0, 1, j = A,B), we can write the total cost functions of firm 0 and firm 1 as follows:
C0 (q0A , q0B ) = c0 (q0A + q0B ) + τq0A (1)
C1 (q1A , q1B ) = F + c1 (q1A + q1B ) + τ (IAq1A + IBq1B ) (2)
where Ij = 0 if FDI goes to j and Ij = 1 otherwise.
We assume that firms face the following linear demands in the two markets:
QA(pA) = α− pA and QB (pB ) = n (α− pB )
where Qj = q0j + q1j and pj are the total quantity and the price to consumers on country j’s
market, respectively. Production and trade costs are assumed not to exceed the consumers’
maximal willingness to pay, i.e., c0 , c1 , τ ≤ α. In addition, to keep our analysis as simple as
possible, we normalize firm 1’s marginal production cost to 0 (c1 = 0) and set α = 1, so that
c0 , τ ∈ [0, 1].
The incumbent firm
11As an example, we can think of a German multinational which has to pick one location between Argentina
and Chile where to build a production plant with the purpose of servicing the consumers of this Latin American
region. In what follows, we assume that the fixed cost F is symmetric across countries and so high that it
will never be profitable for the MNE to pay it twice but not so high to make FDI in the favorite country
unprofitable.
12Several empirical studies show that the market segmentation assumption is consistent with the price-setting
behavior of firms even within the European Union, where, in principle, there should be no official barriers to
cross-border trade. See, for instance, Head and Mayer (2000), Haskel and Wolf (2001), and Lutz (2004).
13In this respect, our model is very similar to the “reciprocal dumping” model of Brander and Krugman
(1983) whose focus is, however, on the welfare effects of trade.
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When the incumbent in the big country is a public firm, its objective is to maximize social
welfare in B, which corresponds to the unweighted sum of domestic consumer surplus and
firm 0’s profits:
WB (q0A , q0B , q1A , q1B ) = CSB (QB ) + Π0 (q0A , q0B , q1A , q1B )
where
CSB (QB ) =
∫ Q
B
0
pB (s)ds− pB (QB ) (q0B + q1B )
and
Π0 (q0A , q0B , q1A , q1B ) = pB (QB )q0B + pA(QA)q0A − C0 (q0A , q0B ) .
The objective function of the public firm can then be rewritten as
WB (q0A , q0B , q1A , q1B ) =
∫ Q
B
0
pB (s)ds− pB (QB )q1B + pA(QA)q0A − C0 (q0A , q0B ) (3)
from which it is evident that welfare in country B increases with the overall quantity sold on
the domestic market - due to the lower consumer price - and decreases with the revenues the
MNE collects by serving that same market.
Firms compete on quantities in the two markets. The linearity of costs allows them to
choose output for one country’s market independently of that for the other. Hence, when it
comes to welfare maximization, it is straightforward to show that the public firm’s reaction
functions are given by:14
qG
0A
= max
{
1− c0 − τ
2
− q1A
2
, 0
}
and qG
0B
= max {n (1− c0) , 0} .
The public firm’s output choice for its domestic market is constant and independent of the
MNE’s quantity decision. On the other hand, its reaction function on the foreign market has
the usual downward slope. This follows from the fact that the public firm behaves as a welfare
maximizer on the domestic market only, while it seeks to maximize profits on country A’s
market.15
Privatization of the incumbent firm changes its objective function. In particular, we sup-
pose that the government of country B privatizes the public firm by selling all of the shares
to domestic investors/residents. Then, if privatization per se does not imply a decrease in
production costs, the only difference with respect to the before-privatization scenario is the
nature of the incumbent firm in B. The privatized firm, indeed, will seek to maximize just its
profits, instead of country B’s welfare. Hence, it is easy to derive the privatized firm’s reaction
functions, which are given by:
qP
0A
= qG
0A
= max
{
1− c0 − τ
2
− q1A
2
, 0
}
and qP
0B
= max
{
n (1− c0)
2
− q1B
2
, 0
}
.
14In what follows, we will use the superscripts G and P to indicate output choices when the incumbent is a
public or a privatized firm, respectively.
15We refer the reader to Amerighi and De Feo (2008) for a thorough analysis of FDI choices in the presence
of a public firm. In that work, it is also shown that the public firm may earn negative overall profits, in which
case lump-sum transfers from domestic residents occur in order to balance the firm’s deficit.
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While the public firm acts as a profit maximizer just in country A, the privatized firm max-
imizes its profits in both markets, so that its output choice for the domestic market is no
longer independent of the MNE’s behavior. Namely, quantities of the two firms are strategic
substitutes in the two markets. Moreover, the privatized firm always earns nonnegative profits
in each country - otherwise, it does not produce for that market.
The foreign firm
The foreign firm is interested in maximizing the profits it may earn from investing in the region.
Since the latter depend on where it locates its production plant, the objective function of the
MNE can be written as follows:
Πj ≡ Πj
1
(q0A , q0B , q1A , q1B ) = pA (QA) q1A + pB (QB ) q1B − C1 (q1A , q1B ) , j = A,B. (4)
Using the total cost function (2) and maximizing (4) with respect to the quantities supplied
in the two markets, we easily derive the reaction functions of the MNE
q1A = max
{
1− IAτ
2
− q0A
2
, 0
}
and q1B = max
{
n
1− IBτ
2
− q0B
2
, 0
}
(5)
where IA = 0 and IB = 1 if FDI occurs in country A, while the reverse is true if FDI occurs
in country B.
4 Market competition
The equilibrium outcome of competition on the product market is affected by whether the
incumbent in the big country is a public or a privatized firm and by the location choice of the
MNE. Therefore, in order to solve the last stage of the game, we have to consider four cases:
(a) no privatization and FDI in country A; (b) no privatization and FDI in country B; (c)
privatization and FDI in country A; and (d) privatization and FDI in country B.
Different market configurations (private or public monopoly versus duopoly) may arise
depending on the values of c0 and τ . By contrast, the difference in market size, n, has no
impact on the structure of the markets.16
In what follows, we will solve for equilibrium quantities in the above-mentioned four cases
and we will denote by qzk
ij
the equilibrium quantity produced by firm i (i = 0, 1) for the market
of country j when FDI occurs in country k (j, k = A,B) and the incumbent is a public or a
privatized firm (z = G,P ).
(a) No privatization and FDI in country A
16This follows from the assumption that all consumers are identical and thus behave in the same way in
equilibrium. An additional consumer buys the good from the two firms in the same proportion as the other
consumers did beforehand. Then the market structure is not sensitive to the number of consumers (n + 1 in
our model) and only the level of profits is affected.
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In the presence of a public welfare-maximizing firm in country B, if the MNE invests, i.e.,
locates its production facility, in the small country, equilibrium quantities are given by:
qGA
0A
= max
{
1−2c0−2τ
3 , 0
}
and qGA
1A
= 13 (1 + c0 + τ) in country A,
qGA
0B
= n (1− c0) and qGA1B = max
{
n(c0−τ)
2 , 0
}
in country B,
where qGA
0A
≥ 0 and qGA
1B
≥ 0 as long as c0 ≤ 1−2τ2 and c0 ≥ τ , respectively.
Since the MNE enters the regional market and produces in loco, exporting to the small
country becomes less profitable for the public firm. In particular, when production and/or
trade costs are too high, the latter stops exporting, thereby leaving monopoly power in the
small market to the MNE. However, by locating in A, the MNE has to incur trade costs to
service country B’s consumers. Hence, exporting is going to be a viable option to it whenever
the cost of supplying the final good to the big country’s market does not exceed the production
cost of the local public firm, i.e., for τ ≤ c0 . If this were not the case, consumers of the big
country will continue to be served by a public monopoly.
Panel (a) of Figure 1 depicts all the possible market configurations in the parameter space
(τ, c0). If, for instance, c0 > τ and c0 <
1−2τ
2 simultaneously hold, both firms sell positive
quantities in both markets. But if the second condition does not hold, FDI in the small
country will drive the public firm out of that market.
Figure 1: Market configurations
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(b) No privatization and FDI in country B
If the MNE chooses to invest in the big country, which already hosts a public welfare-
maximizing firm, equilibrium quantities are given by:
qGB
0A
= max
{
1−2c0−τ
3 , 0
}
and qGB
1A
= 13 (1 + c0 − τ) in country A,
qGB
0B
= qGA
0B
= n (1− c0) and qGB1B =
nc0
2 in country B,
where qGB
0A
≥ 0 as long as c0 ≤ 1−τ2 .
As in case (a), entry in the regional market by the foreign firm reduces the profitability of
exporting to the small country for the incumbent. However, since both firms will incur trade
costs to serve country A’s market, competition will be milder than before. The public firm
will then find it profitable to export for higher values of c0 . Note also that, by locating its
production facility in country B, the MNE will always profitably serve both countries’ markets
despite the competition of the public incumbent.
Panel (b) of Figure 1 represents the two possible market configurations in this case: Cournot
competition always occurs on country B’s market, while we observe either a monopoly by the
foreign MNE or a Cournot duopoly on country A’s market.
(c) Privatization and FDI in country A
Privatization changes the behavior of the incumbent firm on the big country’s market. In the
presence of a privatized profit-maximizing firm in country B, if the MNE invests in the small
country, equilibrium quantities are given by:
qPA
0A
= qGA
0A
and qPA
1A
= qGA
1A
in country A,
qPA
0B
= max
{
n(1−2c0+τ)
3 , 0
}
and qPA
1B
= max
{
n(1+c0−2τ)
3 , 0
}
in country B,
where, as before, qPA
0A
≥ 0 as long as c0 ≤ 1−2τ2 . In addition, qPA0B ≥ 0 and qPA1B ≥ 0 if and
only if c0 ≤ 1+τ2 and c0 ≥ 2τ − 1, respectively.
While no change occurs on country A’s market, the incumbent firm, following privatization,
may no longer find it profitable to compete with the MNE even on its domestic market. For
low production costs, the privatized incumbent will keep producing on both markets. For
intermediate production costs, it will stop exporting to the small market - just like a public
incumbent would have done anyway. But if production costs are large enough, the privatized
incumbent will be induced to exit both markets, where it will be replaced by the foreign MNE.
In spite of that, if trade costs are sufficiently high relative to the incumbent’s productions costs,
investing in A may prevent the MNE from serving country B, thereby leaving monopoly power
on that market to the privatized firm.
Panel (c) of Figure 1 illustrates the different possibilities. If, for instance, c0 >
1+τ
2 , FDI in
the region ensures monopoly power to the foreign firm in both markets. By contrast, for any
c0 < 2τ − 1, investing in A makes exporting unprofitable for the privatized firm but ensures
it monopoly on the big country’s market.
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(d) Privatization and FDI in country B
If the MNE, following privatization, chooses to invest in the big country, equilibrium quantities
are given by:
qPB
0A
= qGB
0A
and qPB
1A
= qGB
1A
in country A,
qPB
0B
= max
{
n(1−2c0)
3 , 0
}
and qPB
1B
=
n(1+c0)
3 in country B,
where qPB
0A
≥ 0 and qPB
0B
≥ 0 as long as c0 ≤ 1−τ2 and c0 ≤ 12 , respectively.
As in case (c), entry of the relatively more efficient MNE in the regional market makes
domestic production less profitable for the privatized firm. Due to the presence of positive
trade costs, such an argument is even stronger for exports. Hence, if the privatized firm is not
efficient enough, it will be forced to stop production in order to avoid losses, and the MNE
will behave as a monopolist on both markets.
Panel (d) of Figure 1 depicts the possible market configurations in this last case.
5 Investment decision of the MNE
Moving backwards in the game tree, we now turn to the analysis of the FDI choice by the
foreign MNE. At this stage, the latter chooses in which country to locate its production plant
with the purpose of serving the whole regional market. The MNE knows whether it will face a
public or a privatized incumbent and anticipates market configurations and equilibrium profits
arising in the last stage of the game.
In order to take its investment decision, the MNE compares its profits from investing in
country A and B. Whenever ΠA = ΠB, the MNE is indifferent between investing in either
country, and the gain in profits on A’s market of locating in A over B exactly compensates
the gain in profits on B’s market of locating in B over A. Indeed:
ΠA = ΠB ⇐⇒ piA
A
+ piA
B
= piB
A
+ piB
B
⇐⇒ piA
A
− piB
A
= piB
B
− piA
B
where pik
j
stands for the MNE’s profits on j’s market when FDI goes to country k (j, k = A,B).
When the two countries have the same market size (n = 1), the presence of an incumbent
firm - although less efficient than the MNE - is a strong disincentive to invest in country B.
Intuitively, as there exist positive trade costs separating the two markets, the MNE prefers
to locate as distant as possible from its competitor. In particular, when the incumbent is a
public welfare-maximizing firm, the foreign firm will always invest in country A.
In general, however, the investment decision of the foreign MNE is driven by three effects.
The market size effect captures the relative asymmetry between the two countries’ markets:
a larger n increases the relative profitability of investing in the big country and FDI is more
likely to take place there. The cost effect reflects the efficiency of the incumbent firm: as
intuition suggests, the higher c0 , the higher the attractiveness of country B since the MNE
faces a weaker competitor on the big market. The competition effect is related to τ . Bjorvatn
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and Eckel (2006, p. 1896) claim that “the higher are the trade costs, the more protected are the
national markets from international competition, and the more important is the competition
argument in favor of location in [the small country]”. But this is not always true in our
model. Higher trade costs, indeed, can increase the relative profitability of investing in the
big country. If the incumbent is inefficient enough and/or country B’s market is sufficiently
larger than country A’s one, the MNE may prefer to locate as close as possible to consumers
in B since the profit loss in B from investing in A would exceed that in A from investing in
B. Therefore, the effect of τ on the FDI decision is ambiguous and depends on the values of
c0 and n and on the market configurations prevailing in the two countries.
Figure 2 illustrates the investment decision of the MNE in the parameter space (τ, c0) for
selected values of the size-asymmetry parameter n (i.e., n = 1, 2, 3) when the incumbent is a
public welfare-maximizing firm. It essentially defines, for a given n, the values of the param-
eters c0 and τ such that the MNE chooses to invest in one of the two countries anticipating
market configurations and equilibrium profits arising in the last stage of the game. The bold
line in the central and in the right panel of the Figure identifies the indifference condition,
i.e., the locus where ΠA = ΠB.17
First of all, it is evident that an increase in market asymmetry, i.e., a larger n, raises the
profitability of locating a production plant in B. As for the cost effect, the more inefficient the
incumbent firm, the more profitable investing in B: for given values of n > 1 and τ ∈ [0, 1],
indeed, as we let c0 increase from zero, the MNE eventually prefers locating in B over A.
Finally, the competition effect crucially depends on the market configurations resulting from
the FDI choice. Consider, for example, the right panel of Figure 2 - which depicts a situation
where the difference in market size is sufficiently large (n = 3) - and take a value of c0 just
below 1/2 and τ = 0. In this case, Cournot competition always occurs in both markets
and the competition effect works in the intuitive direction suggested by Bjorvatn and Eckel
(2006). The same occurs when trade costs are sufficiently high. For intermediate values of τ ,
instead, the competition effect is such that higher trade costs make country B relatively more
attractive. This happens in spite of the fact that investing in A would guarantee monopoly
profits to the MNE on that market. But the consequent profit loss on the big market gets
larger for higher trade costs and eventually exceeds the gain on the small one. Hence, the
foreign firm prefers to locate as close as possible to consumers in the big country.
While the effects of privatization on the attractiveness of country B will be discussed in
the next Section, it is easy to show that, with a privatized incumbent, the impact of n, c0
and τ on the FDI decision are qualitatively equivalent to the case of a public incumbent. In
fact, the larger the asymmetry in market size and/or the lower the efficiency of the incumbent
firm, the more profitable will be to invest in B. Similarly, the sign of the competition effect is
related to the market structure arising from the location choice.
17The indifference locus has been derived - and then plotted - by comparing profits from investing in A and
in B for each of the possible market configurations. See the Appendix for details.
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Figure 2: FDI decision with a public incumbent in B for n = 1, 2, 3
6 The effects of privatization
In this Section we compare the outcome of the game with a public incumbent and the one of
the game with the privatized firm.
Firstly we will look at the effect on the attractiveness of the country: does privatization
increase MNE’s profitability of investing in country B? The answer is unambiguous and given
in Proposition 1.
Secondly, we will look at the effects on Country B’s consumer surplus and welfare. Do
consumers benefit from privatization? What is the overall effect on welfare? Proposition 2
deals with these issues.
In general, privatization decreases the importance of the cost effect relative to the market
size effect in driving the investment decision of the MNE. On the big market, the privatized
firm produces as long as its profits are nonnegative and it clearly represents a much weaker
competitor for the MNE than the public firm, which either runs losses or realizes zero profits
from sales. In the small country, instead, privatization does not affect the intensity of market
competition. Hence, the cost effect is less likely to discourage the MNE from investing in
the big country than before privatization, and higher values of n dramatically increase the
attractiveness of country B because of the market size effect. In particular, if the privatized
firm is too inefficient (c0 >
1
2), the MNE always invests in the big country as this allows it to
be a monopolist on both markets and to serve the relatively large market without incurring
any trade costs.
Figure 3, shows the effect of privatization on the investment decision of the MNE. The
grey areas represent the parameter space (τ, c0) where privatization changes the decision of the
MNE and induces it to invest in country B. The impact of privatization on the attractiveness
of the big country is evident from this Figure and consistent with our discussion above, so
that we can state
Proposition 1 Privatization always increases the attractiveness of the big country.
Privatization of the formerly-public firm makes it more likely that the MNE invests in
country B rather than A. This is because, following privatization, the incumbent firm produces
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Figure 3: Impact of privatization on the FDI decision for n = 1, 2, 3
a lower output and becomes a weaker competitor for the MNE. However, in spite of its FDI-
attracting property, privatization does not necessarily make the big country better off. On the
contrary, whenever the domestic firm is able to compete with the MNE and remains on the
market after privatization (i.e., when c0 < 1/2), welfare always decreases as Figure 4 clearly
shows. This allows us to state
Proposition 2 An FDI-attracting privatization decreases social welfare whenever the priva-
tized firm stays in the market. Privatization may increase welfare only if it resolves in shutting
down the (very inefficient) public firm.
Figure 4: Impact of privatization on country B’s welfare for n = 1, 2, 3
The intuition behind Proposition 2 is that when privatization induces the MNE to invest
in the big country, the increase in profits for the incumbent firm can never compensate for
the loss in consumer surplus of domestic residents. Hence, social welfare in the big country
decreases. This happens despite the fact that the privatized firm remains entirely in the hands
of domestic residents. Indeed, if we allow for the possibility of foreign acquisition, the welfare-
reducing impact of an FDI-attracting privatization will be even stronger unless country B’s
government is able to sell the firm at a value which fully reflects its future profit earnings. It
is thus evident that the decision of privatizing the public firm entails a trade-off for the big
country between attractiveness and welfare.
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7 Policy competition for FDI
In this Section, we extend the game theoretic description of the FDI choice by introducing a
pre-location stage in which the government of the two countries simultaneously and indepen-
dently offer to the MNE a tax/subsidy package to which they are subsequently committed.18
The MNE then makes her location choice on the basis not only of the (pre-tax) profits but also
of the fiscal policies of the competing countries. In the last stage of the game the MNE and the
incumbent compete on the two markets, profits are realized, and taxes or subsidies are paid.
We solve our three-stage games with a public and with a private incumbent, respectively, and
then perform a comparative statics exercise to analyze the relationship between privatization
and fiscal policies.
We assume that the country receiving FDI can levy a lump-sum tax on the foreign firm’s
profits or has to offer a lump-sum subsidy in order to induce it to establish a production plant
within its frontiers. We denote country j’s fiscal policy by Sj , j = A,B. The equilibrium
policy will be a lump-sum tax when the host country already represents the favorite location
for the MNE in the absence of policy competition; otherwise, it will be a lump-sum subsidy
which makes the MNE prefer a country to the other.
To analyze policy competition, we first need to identify the maximum subsidy each country
is willing to offer to the MNE. We define such a subsidy as the country’s welfare gain of
receiving the investment, i.e., Smax
j
≡ W j
j
−W k
j
, for j, k = A,B, j 6= k, with W k
j
denoting
country j’s welfare when FDI goes to country k (j, k = A,B). While welfare in country B
consists of consumer surplus and public firm’s profits as given by (3), welfare in country A
simply coincides with consumer surplus as no local firm operates there prior to the MNE’s
entry on the regional market.
When countries compete to attract FDI, the MNE will invest in country j if and only if
Πj + Smax
j
> Πk + Smax
k
, for j, k = A,B, j 6= k (6)
i.e., when profits from locating in j – inclusive of the lump-sum subsidy country j offers –
exceed those – subsidy inclusive – from investing in k. Note, however, that because of different
market size, cost-asymmetry, and the presence of positive costs for intra-regional trade, the
MNE may prefer to invest in a country where part of its profits are taxed away in spite of the
fact that the other country offers a subsidy.
The equilibrium policy (subsidy or tax) is the result of an auction where the country
making the most attractive offer receives the investment by the MNE.19 When both countries
offer the maximum subsidy to attract FDI, country j wins the auction if condition (6) holds;
however, country j need not actually pay the maximum subsidy it is willing to offer but just
18The assumption of government commitment may be justified on the ground of credibility. It prevents the
trivial result in which the MNE does not invest in the region in order to avoid the full seizure of its profits.
19See the Appendix for a formal proof. The simultaneous auction equilibrium outcome is equivalent to the
one under Bertrand price competition for FDI between the two countries.
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the one which is necessary to out-bid the rival country, which is given by:20
S∗
j
≡ Πk + Smax
k
−Πj > 0, for j, k = A,B, j 6= k.
We now investigate how the interaction of fiscal and privatization policies affects the attrac-
tiveness of the big country. Figure 5, which is drawn for the case n = 2, is useful to illustrate
the impact of tax/subsidy competition and privatization both on the investment decision of
the MNE and on welfare of country B. First of all, it suggests that tax/subsidy competi-
tion allows the big country to reduce the negative impact on welfare of an FDI-attracting
privatization. We summarize this result in
Proposition 3 Tax/subsidy competition decreases the negative impact of an FDI-attracting
privatization on social welfare.
The intuition is simple. Privatization dramatically increases the attractiveness of the big
country. Hence, it is extremely beneficial for the MNE to invest there instead of investing
in the small country. This, in turn, implies that country B can tax away part of the profit
gain from investing there (without changing the FDI decision of the foreign firm), thereby
increasing welfare above the before-privatization level.21
Figure 5: Impact of privatization and tax/subsidy competition for n = 2
Figure 5 also shows that, after privatization, tax/subsidy competition enlarges the param-
eter space (τ, c0) where the MNE chooses to invest in the small country. This is because the
big country’s gain from receiving FDI is lower than before privatization, which translates into
a less generous fiscal policy to attract FDI. This allows us to claim
20When country j represents the most attractive location for FDI without offering any subsidy and despite
the fact that country k offers its maximum affordable subsidy, country j wins the auction by taxing away part
of the MNE’s profits. In such a situation, the lump-sum tax represents an entrance fee that country j charges
the firm for establishing its production plant there.
21Policy competition, however, does not prevent country B’s welfare to decrease as a result of an FDI-
attracting privatization when countries are symmetric (n = 1). In such a situation, indeed, country B is always
willing to offer a subsidy (in equilibrium) which lowers its net-of-subsidy welfare below the corresponding level
before privatization.
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Proposition 4 Following privatization, tax/subsidy competition increases the attractiveness
of the small country.
After privatization, the big country is less eager to attract FDI than it was before. Hence, the
small country will represent a more attractive location for the investment and can even succeed
in hosting the MNE by taxing away part of its profit gain from investing there. Intuitively,
the net effect on country B’s welfare of receiving FDI can now be negative since the gain in
consumer surplus could not be sufficiently high to counteract the loss in domestic firm’s profits.
This implies that the big country may be willing to tax the MNE in order to discourage it
from investing there and to protect the domestic industry from foreign competition. Such
a result puts forward an argument for the protectionist role of tax/subsidy competition for
FDI. Moreover, it is consistent with the finding by Bjorvatn and Eckel (2006) according to
which the big country may gain from not receiving FDI when its market size is relatively large.
However, our conclusions are more general than theirs in that the privatized firm in the big
country can be either as efficient as or less efficient than the foreign MNE.
8 Other Issues
In this Section, we discuss the robustness of our results to some specific issues in order to
check to what extent they depend on the assumptions of the model.
Firstly, privatization does not entail any efficiency gain in our set-up.22 In spite of that,
the fundamental trade-off between attractiveness and welfare is robust to the inclusion of
efficiency gains. Suppose that the highest possible efficiency gains are achieved by privatization
and the incumbent becomes as efficient as the MNE. It is then easy to show that for high
values of c0 and τ , privatization with full efficiency gains increases welfare but induces the
MNE to invest in the other country, while the opposite occurs for low values of the two
parameters. Attractiveness and welfare may simultaneously increase only for intermediate
values. Furthermore, if we focus on consumer surplus only, the result is even stronger: for
any value of the parameters, privatization increases the attractiveness of country B only if the
market price increases and consumers are worse off.23
Secondly, we have implicitly left out the possibility that consumers - or other economic
agents - take advantage of arbitrage opportunities. If arbitrage were possible, instead, firms
would be constrained in their output choices. The arbitrage constraint would affect competi-
tion just in the small country’s market before privatization. The public firm, indeed, would
behave less aggressively on that market - where it will never export to. As a result, the rel-
ative profitability of investing in the small country increases. But this, in turn, implies that
22As a matter of fact, the empirical evidence in this respect is mixed and the variance of the results is
substantial (see Cuervo and Villalonga, 2000). On the other hand, there is general agreement on the fact that
liberalization processes and increased competition enhance firms’ efficiency. See, for example, the meta-reviews
of Villalonga (2000), Megginson and Netter (2001), and Willner (2001).
23We can also show that the latter result is robust to a departure from our linear cost and demand setting
and is valid whenever Cournot equilibrium exists and is unique.
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privatization will be more effective in improving the attractiveness of the big country.
Thirdly, one can call into question the absence of a budget constraint, i.e., a break even
condition, for the public firm. Public firms, indeed, may be required to balance their budget
in order to avoid the use of distortionary taxation to cover their deficit. If we introduce such
a break even condition, the public firm’s maximization problem turns out to be equivalent
to a problem where the objective function is a weighted average of welfare and profits. As
a consequence, the firm’s behavior is somehow halfway between an unconstrained welfare
maximizer and a profit maximizer. In particular, the firm behaves either as in our original
set-up or less aggressively than before, thereby increasing the attractiveness of the big country.
For this reason, privatization becomes a weaker instrument to attract FDI, and in such a sense,
the break even requirement can be viewed as a - milder - alternative to privatization.
Finally, we let firms compete in quantities - that are strategic substitutes - on the two
markets. It is thus fair to wonder what happens when the two firms’ products are strategic
complements. To this end, we consider a differentiated products duopoly with linear demand
in both markets where firms compete on prices.24 Straightforward computations yield upward-
sloping reaction functions for the MNE and for the public - and the privatized - firm. Both
firms will always be active in the two markets as long as their products are sufficiently differen-
tiated. Moreover, the FDI decision of the MNE will now also depend on the degree of product
differentiation. In particular, the relative gain from investing in B increases with market-size
asymmetry only when trade costs are high enough compared to the latter. In spite of that, it
is possible to show that privatization always make it more profitable for the MNE to invest in
country B even in a model with strategic substitutes.
9 Conclusions
Several empirical studies about Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe have put
forward the FDI-attracting property of privatization and, in particular, of domestic privati-
zation programs. The main speculative argument is that potential foreign investors interpret
privatization as a signal of a more favorable economic environment.
In this paper, we provide an alternative micro-founded explanation of why privatization
may attract foreign investors interested in entering a regional market. By changing the objec-
tive of the incumbent firm in the big country, privatization turns the formerly-public firm into
a less aggressive competitor for the MNE since profit-maximizing output is lower than the
welfare-maximizing one. This, in turn, translates into larger profit opportunities for foreign
competitors. The drawback is that social welfare generally decreases. This attractiveness-
welfare trade-off has been illustrated in a simple model where we isolate the main forces
driving our results. Then, we have extended our analysis to account for intra-regional exports
in the presence of positive trade costs, relative inefficiency of the incumbent firm in the big
market, and the possibility of lump-sum tax/subsidy competition between the two countries
24See Hindriks and Claude (2006) for a mixed oligopoly model with differentiated products where firms
compete either in prices or in quantities.
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to attract FDI. We have found that the attractiveness-welfare trade-off resulting from an
FDI-attracting privatization policy is still at work in our extended set-up. Moreover, the pos-
sibly negative impact on welfare may be mitigated in the presence of tax/subsidy competition
since the big country now has an instrument to tax away part of the MNE’s profit gain from
investing there.
To sum up, the presence of a public firm (although relatively inefficient) is a strong disin-
centive for a foreign firm to invest in the country even if the latter represents a large market
for its product. However, privatization per se is not necessarily good news from the big coun-
try’s perspective as it might attract FDI while decreasing welfare. If this were the case, the
possibility of competing in fiscal policies may be an improvement to the extent that it endows
the big country with an instrument which it can use either to protect its local producers from
foreign competitors or to extract part of the rents the foreign firm earns by locating there.
Our findings thus shed light on the relationship between privatization and fiscal policies
aimed at attracting FDI. Privatization may represent an alternative policy instrument that
the government uses to improve the attractiveness of a country for foreign investors. On the
other hand, fiscal policies might help reducing (or preventing) the negative impact on domestic
welfare of an FDI-attracting privatization. This substitute/complementary relationship be-
tween the two policies raises the empirical testable prediction that privatization may be more
effective in attracting FDI in regions where tax competition is more intense. This appears to
be a promising task for future research.
Appendix
FDI choice and market configurations
Depending on the values of c0 and τ , on whether FDI goes to country A or B, and on the nature
of the incumbent inB, different market configurations may arise. We have depicted them in the
parameter space (τ, c0) with the four panels of Figure 1. In order to determine the investment
decision by the MNE, we superimpose the two top panels - in the case of a public incumbent
- and the two bottom panels - in the case of a privatized incumbent - respectively. This is
shown in Figure 6. Tables 1 and 2 then summarize the market configurations corresponding
to the different regions identified in the two panels of Figure 6.
Investment decision with a public incumbent
Table 3 shows the values of equilibrium profits and welfare in the big country when FDI goes
to country A or B and the incumbent is a public firm.
When FDI goes to A, the MNE behaves as a monopolist on that market - producing
qA
1A
= 12 - if the public firm does not export to A or as a duopolist otherwise. Hence, the price
to consumers in A is given by pA =
1
2 or pA =
1+c0+τ
3 , respectively. In B, the public firm
behaves as a public monopoly if the MNE does not export to B or as a duopolist otherwise,
implying pB = c0 or pB =
c0+τ
2 , respectively. When FDI goes to B, instead, the MNE always
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Figure 6: FDI choice and market configurations
FDI in A FDI in B
Region Country A Country B Country A Country B
I MNE monopoly Cournot MNE monopoly Cournot
II MNE monopoly Cournot Cournot Cournot
III Cournot Cournot Cournot Cournot
IV Cournot Public Monopoly Cournot Cournot
V MNE monopoly Public Monopoly Cournot Cournot
VI MNE monopoly Public Monopoly MNE monopoly Cournot
Table 1: Regions and market configurations with a public incumbent
FDI in A FDI in B
Region Country A Country B Country A Country B
I MNE monopoly MNE monopoly MNE monopoly MNE monopoly
II MNE monopoly Cournot MNE monopoly MNE monopoly
III MNE monopoly Cournot MNE monopoly Cournot
IV MNE monopoly Cournot Cournot Cournot
V Cournot Cournot Cournot Cournot
VI MNE monopoly Privatized Monopoly Cournot Cournot
VII MNE monopoly Privatized Monopoly MNE monopoly Cournot
VIII MNE monopoly Privatized Monopoly MNE monopoly MNE monopoly
Table 2: Regions and market configurations with a privatized incumbent
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behaves as a duopolist on that market due to the presence of the incumbent public firm.
Hence, the price to consumers in B is always given by pB =
c0
2 . In A, the MNE behaves as
a monopolist - producing qB
1A
= 1−τ2 - if the public firm does not export to that country or
as a duopolist otherwise, implying pA =
1+τ
2 or pA =
1+c0+2τ
3 , respectively. Straightforward
computations allow us to derive profits of the MNE from investing in A or in B and the
corresponding welfare in the two countries. Then, profit and welfare differentials for the
different regions of the left panel in Figure 6 can be easily determined by using Table 3.
FDI in A
Market in A, B ΠA + F WA
B
Mon, CN 1
4
+
n(c0−τ)
2
4
n(2−c0−τ)
2
8
− n(1−c0)(c0−τ)
2
CN, CN
(1+c0+τ)
2
9
+
n(c0−τ)
2
4
n(2−c0−τ)
2
8
+
(1−2c0−2τ)
2
9
− n(1−c0)(c0−τ)
2
CN, Pub Mon
(1+c0+τ)
2
9
n(1−c0)
2
2
+
(1−2c0−2τ)
2
9
Mon, Pub Mon 1
4
n(1−c0)
2
2
FDI in B
Market in A, B ΠB + F WB
B
Mon, CN (1−τ)
2
4
+
nc2
0
4
n(2−c0)
2
8
− n(1−c0)c0
2
CN, CN
(1+c0−τ)
2
9
+
nc2
0
4
n(2−c0)
2
8
+
(1−2c0−τ)
2
9
− n(1−c0)c0
2
Table 3: Profits and welfare from FDI in A or in B with a public incumbent
Investment decision with a privatized incumbent
Table 4 shows the values of equilibrium profits and welfare in the big country when FDI goes
to country A or B and the incumbent is a privatized firm.
Following privatization, the MNE’s behavior on the small market is the same as in the
presence of a public firm. But the way firms compete in the big country changes. When FDI
goes to A, the privatized firm behaves as a monopolist - producing qPA
0B
=
n(1−c0)
2 - if the
MNE does not export to B or as a duopolist otherwise, implying pB =
1+c0
2 or pB =
1+c0+τ
3 ,
respectively. However, since the privatized firm does not want to run losses, the MNE can
enjoy monopoly power in B (even by investing in A): whenever c0 >
1+τ
2 , the privatized firm
indeed shuts down and the MNE sets the monopoly price pB =
1+τ
2 and sells the quantity
qPA
1B
= n(1−τ)2 . When FDI goes to B, instead, the MNE always behaves either as a duopolist
or as a monopolist - producing qPB
1B
= n2 - on that market, where the incumbent privatized
firm produces as long as it earns nonnegative profits. Hence, the price to consumers in B is
given by either pB =
1+c0
3 or pB =
1
2 . Straightforward computations allow us to derive profits
of the MNE from investing in A or in B and the corresponding welfare in the two countries.
Then, profit and welfare differentials for the different regions of the right panel in Figure 6
can be easily determined by using Table 4.
Proof of Proposition 1. This result follows from an intuitive and straightforward
argument. First of all, notice that public and privatized firm behave identically on country A’s
market. On the domestic market, however, the privatized firm is a less aggressive competitor
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FDI in A
Market in A, B ΠA + F WA
B
Mon, CN 1
4
+
n(1+c0−2τ)
2
9
n(2−c0−τ)
2
18
+
n(1−2c0+τ)
2
9
CN, CN
(1+c0+τ)
2
9
+
n(1+c0−2τ)
2
9
n(2−c0−τ)
2
18
+
n(1−2c0+τ)
2
9
+
(1−2c0−2τ)
2
9
Mon, Mon 1
4
+ n(1−τ)
2
4
n(1−τ)2
8
Mon, Priv Mon 1
4
n(1−τ)2
8
+
n(1−c0)
2
4
FDI in B
Market in A, B ΠB + F WB
B
Mon, Mon (1−τ)
2
4
+ n
4
n
8
Mon, CN (1−τ)
2
4
+
n(1+c0)
2
9
n(2−c0)
2
18
+
n(1−2c0)
2
9
CN, CN
(1+c0−τ)
2
9
+
n(1+c0)
2
9
n(2−c0)
2
18
+
(1−2c0−τ)
2
9
+
n(1−2c0)
2
9
Table 4: Profits and welfare from FDI in A or in B with a privatized incumbent
than the public firm, so that the MNE faces a larger residual demand. Hence, independently
of where FDI goes to, local profits in B are higher when the incumbent is the privatized firm.
This, in turn, implies that the gain in profits from investing in B over A is always bigger than
in the presence of the public firm.
Proof of Proposition 2. To understand and prove such a sufficient condition, we can
compare the worst situation - in terms of country B’s welfare - before privatization with the
best one after. Before privatization, when FDI goes to A, the worst it can happen is to have
a public monopoly serving the domestic market. As the public firm always produces the same
quantity in B, every market configuration in which the MNE produces a positive quantity for
that market increases welfare since the gain in consumer surplus always exceeds the loss in
public firm’s profits. For the same reason, after privatization, the best situation is to have
Cournot duopoly on both countries’ markets. This is so also because the privatized firm can
never be a monopolist on the foreign market.
We divide our proof in two steps: first, we isolate the pure privatization effect on country
B’s welfare; then, we consider the FDI-switch effect on the privatized firm’s profits.
(i) When the incumbent firm is efficient enough (namely, c0 <
1
2), the total quantity pro-
duced for the big country’s market by a public monopoly, Q0M
B
= n (1− c0), is greater
than that supplied by a private duopoly, QPD
B
= n3 (2− c0). Then, the sum of con-
sumer surplus and incumbent firm’s profits on the domestic market is always smaller
after privatization. Therefore, the pure privatization effect is negative for any market
configuration when c0 <
1
2 .
(ii) The FDI switch from A to B following privatization leads to a profit loss on the domestic
market and a profit gain on the foreign market for the privatized firm. The overall effect
turns out to be negative because of the cost and of the market size effects. To see this,
suppose that countries are symmetric so that the market size effect disappears. If the
MNE invests in B rather than A, the privatized firm’s profits are lower because the
gain on the foreign market does not compensate for the loss on the domestic market.
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Introducing market-size asymmetry makes such an argument even stronger since the loss
occurs in the bigger market.
To sum up, both the pure privatization and the FDI-switch effects have a negative impact
on country B’s welfare, and the condition c0 <
1
2 ensures that the privatized firm stays in the
market if the MNE invests in B. This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4. Since the privatized firm’s reaction function is downward
sloping, any increase in the MNE’s output in B reduces the privatized firm’s quantity with a
negative effect both on its profits and on country B’s consumer surplus. From the FDI-switch
effect (Proof of Proposition 2), we know that if the MNE invests in B rather than A, the
gain in privatized firm’s profits on the foreign market does not compensate for the loss on the
domestic market. This is enough to conclude that ΠA + Smax
A
> ΠB + Smax
B
when ΠA = ΠB.
Equilibrium of the policy-competition-for-FDI game
The policy-competition-for-FDI game is equivalent to a Bertrand-competition game in prices
between countries A and B and it is characterized by a multiplicity of equilibria. Denoting
by j the country that receives FDI by the foreign firm and by k the other country (j, k =
A,B, j 6= k), the equilibrium can be generally defined as follows:
S∗
k
(
Sj
)
= , with  ∈ (0, Smax
k
)
S∗
j
(S
k
) such that Πj
(
S∗
j
)
= Πk
(
Smax
k
)
and the proof is a straightforward application of the Bertrand-competition solution.
Suppose that condition (6) holds, so that for country j to win the competition for FDI,
it has to pay a positive subsidy to the foreign firm. If this were the case, the equilibrium
strategy pair of the two countries is given by:
S∗
k
(
Sj
)
= , with  ∈ (0, Smax
k
)
S∗
j
(
Smax
k
) ≡ Πk + Smax
k
−Πj > 0
For country k, any bid  ∈ (0, Smax
k
)
is a best reply to country j’s equilibrium strategy since
k’s payoff is always nil. Indeed, it can never attract the foreign investor even by offering
its maximum subsidy. For country j, any other bid S′
j
(·) < S∗
j
(
Smax
k
)
is not an equilibrium
strategy since country k will have the opportunity of attracting FDI by offering the foreign firm
Smax
k
, which would imply Πk
(
Smax
k
)
> Πj
(
S′
j
)
. By contrast, any other bid S′
j
(·) > S∗
j
(
Smax
k
)
is not a best reply to S∗
k
(
Sj
)
because it leaves some extra-money on the table, i.e., to the
foreign firm.
The same argument applies when the profit gain from investing in country j is so large
that country j can win the competition for FDI by levying a positive lump-sum tax on the
foreign firm’s profits in spite of the fact that country k offers its maximum subsidy. In this
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case, the equilibrium strategy pair of the two countries is given by:
S∗
k
(
Sj
)
= , with  ∈ (0, Smax
k
)
T ∗
j
(
Smax
k
) ≡ Πj − (Πk + Smax
k
)
> 0
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